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INDONESIA: FROM BRIEFCASE TO SAMURAI SWORD 
Anthony Reid 
The role of the Japanese in the creation of modern Indonesia remains an e11<>-
t 1 vc question, particularly for those who were involved in the events. Since 
1 he Dutch attacked the infant Indonesian Republic in 1945 as a Japanese 
~rcation, nationalists were initially at pains to show the world that they had 
no debts to Tokyo. Most Western scholars have been prepared to give the 1 
11:1tionalis ts the benefit of .the doubt, but it has not been so easy for the 
.Japanese, some of whom felt wounded by the "ingratitude" of Indonesians . 
This debate, like many others in modern Indonesian history, has focused on the 
1Jramatic events surrounding the proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 
/1111:ust 1945. It is these events which have drawn the special attention of 
writers of memoirs, with firsthand accounts from Hatta, Adam Malik, Sukarno 
unJ Subardjo on the Indonesian side, and Nishijima and Miyoshi on the Japanese. 
Nlshijima, the most prolific of the Japanese participants, explains that he 
h1·i:an to write his version of the proclamation out of a sense of injury, when 
ht> learned in 1951 that he could not obtain a visa to revisit his Indonesian 
fr i ends because of Indonesian official sensitivity on this question.I In the 
, evcral books he has written or inspired, Nishijima has insisted that it should 
not be forgotten that the independence proclamation was drafted in the house 
of hi s superior, Admiral Maeda, at a meeting in which both Maeda and Nishijima 
were seated at the principal conference table with Sukarno, Hatta and Subardjo. 
~1iyoshi also r epresented the Japanese Army at the meeting, in the hope of 
lmpl i cating the Army in an effective fait accompli. 2 In a 1959 publication, a 
i:rnup of Japanese scholars renewed their complaint that these facts had been 
' "!'Pressed by Indonesian writers, and pleaded that "a clarification of this 
fu c t now would not soil their national history."3 Hatta's most recent memoir 
11 ccepted only a part of the Japanese version . " On the occasion of Admiral 
~Lr eJa ' s death in December 1977, the Japanese concerned were therefore under-
s landably gratified to receive a telegram from Adam Malik, now Indonesian Vice 
!'resident, but in 1945 a strenuous upholder of the view that independence 
, 110uld be proc laimed in complete defiance of the Japanese. Thirty-two years 
ufter the event, ~la l i k could generously acknowledge Maeda' s "great help in the 
prrparatory stage of our i ndependence," and proclaim that Maeda' s name ''will 
be ~rit tcn in t he annals of Indonesia with golden letters. 115 
The proc lamat i on question has more to do with personal feelings and national 
pnde than with historical causation. Here, as in the whole question of the 
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Japanese period, it is important to remember that the important actors contin-
ued to be Indonesian. It is they who defined the eventual shape of indepen-
dent Indonesia by responding to whatever political opportunities each period 
offered, whatever resonances each foreign model set up in their own tradition. 
The arguroent of this essay is that the Japanese occupation brought such pro-
found change that it is not inappropriate to regard 1942 as the beginning of 
the whole revolutionary upheaval which gave birth to modern Indonesia. Never-
theless, these changes were in very few cases the result of deliberate Japan-
ese .planning& but rather of Indonesian responses to a radically altered 
env1ronaent. 
There are a nurober of reasons why 1942 marked a more permanent break with the 
past in Indonesia than in other parts of Southeast Asia . Some of them have to 
do with the fact that the Netherlands was not a major world power and could 
on l y have maintained its influence in Southeast Asia in conditions of great 
stability. A few embittered Dutch politicians complained after the war that 
the Ang lo-Saxons had deliberately manipulated the postwar crisis to ensure 
that their interests prevailed in Indonesia at the expense of the Dutch. Jn 
reality, the dramatic events of the 1940s only telescoped a shift which was 
inevitable in the long run. The place of the Dutch language was a sympto• of 
this shift. The Japanese officially discouraged English and French elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia, while in practice frequently making use of these languages 
for effective communication . By contrast, they had no use whatever for Dutch, 
and found Indonesian (or occasionally even English) much more practically use-
ful. While the older Dutch-educated generation of Indonesians naturally found 
it painful to have to forego the public use of Dutch, they were themselves 
acutely aware that it was not internationally useful, and that there was an 
extra indignity in having been coloni~ed by a second-class power.7 Even if 
Japan lost the war, Holland could not win it. 
The other remarkable feature of the Indonesian case was the hannonious start 
given to Japanese- Indonesian relations by the almost universal Indonesian 
welcome to the invaders. The reasons usually given for this are the poor 
Dutch record in political (as opposed to social) emancipation, the exaggerated 
hopes of Japan dating back to the Russo-Japanese war, and the Joyoboyo 
prophecy in Java which strengthened popular belief that deliverance fr011 
foreign oppression would come at the hands of another group of foreigners 
whose rule would be very short. If we compare the Indonesian response with 
the more ambivalent one in the Philippines, Bunna, Malaya, or Vietnam, however, 
there are two other factors which assume larger proportions. Firstly, the 
influence of "anti-fascist" preconceptions, whether of European democratic, 
Marxist, or Chinese derivation, was very low. Most of Indonesia' s left-wing 
politicians remained impotent in exile . It is significant that the attempt of 
the most important Marxist politician at liberty, Amir Sjarifuddin, to use 
Dutch money to start an anti-Japanese underground in Java, proved more of a 
handicap than a strength to him in his subsequent career as a nationalist 
leader. The other important factor was t~at the Japanese did not have to 
fight their way into Indonesia, with all the destruction and suffering that 
would have caused. After the fall of Singapore and the Battle of the Java 
Sea, the Dutch knew they were beaten and did not even attempt to defend the 
major cities. In some Muslim strongholds in the Outer Islands, such as Acch 
(Sumatra), Gorontalo and Bone (both Sulawesi), Indonesians themselves acted to 
speed the Dutch departure , and could welcome tho Japanese to already " liber-
ated" areas. This relatively peaceful takeover encouraged a massive loss of 
Indonesian faith in Dutch competence, while placing few initial stains on the 
Japanese record. 
The high hopes placed in. the.Japanese ~ere quickly d~shed with the banning of .. . 
litical activity and experience of military brutality; yet the effect of ~~is harmonious start ~as not entirely lost . A number of battle-scarred 
Ja anese soldiers were surprised and relieved to find themselves at last in a fr~endly environment, while the civilian "experts," accustomeq to the idea that 
thr Dutch had built a "model" colonial system, we:e pu~zled at Indonesian 
enthusiasm to escape from it.8 General Imamura Hitoshi, the" ~onqueror of Java, 
was one who was very struck by his reception: 
Many natives gathered round us from far and near, the way co\Dltry 
people in Japan run to the road when soldiers are marching during 
1113noeuvres. The natives .•. brought coconuts, bananas and papayas 
to the Ja_panese ..• Many of the natives were cheerfu~ly raisin& 
their hands with their thumbs up. Some Japanese officers took 
from their pockets the Japanese-Indonesian conve:sation ~iction~ 
aries .•. and began talking with the adults and children with the 
help of gestures. I wondered 'ls this really a battlefield?' .• . 
Spontaneously I said to Major-General Okazaki: 'Chief ?f Staf~, 
we have already won the battle • •• ,9 . -.-
Throughout his 1942 term as commander in Java, Imamura was to insist· that the 
warmth of this reception made the ironhanded approach applied in other areas, 
particularly Malaya, inappropriate for Java. To the argument of.n';ll°ero~ high-
powered emissaries from Tokyo and Singapore that "a forceful administration 
like that in Singapore is the way to make the. coloured peop~e ?bey ~· ttlO he 
replied that a milder policy based on pragmatism and economic incentives was 
the only way to restore production quickly without altogether alienating the 
population. 
The so-c~lled "soft" policy of Imamura was somewhat modified by his successors, 
and was not replicated in most of the other islands. One of Imamura's most 
P°"'erful critics in Tokyo, General Muto Akira, in fact became military comman-
der in Sumatra in 1943. In Kalimantan the Japanese committed some of the 
worst atrocities of the war, decimating the Indonesian political elite. Never-
theless, the model established by Imamura in Java was critical -- firstly, 
because he won the open ad~iration of Sukarno and the cooperation of most 
other Indonesian politicians, who found it difficult to change course subse-
quently; secondly, because the very lack of political opportunity under the 
Japanese in the outer islands made it more certain that Java would be the 
model for the subsequent revolution. 
Economic Change 
The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia was of course intended to secure the 
supply of strategic r aw materia ls to Japan -- in particular oil, rubber, tin, 
and other metals of Indonesia. The initi al Japanese policy therefore was to 
continue and even accentuate the export orientation of the colonial economies 
and their dependence on industria l imports. The consequence of the war was 
the reverse of this. By the middle of 1943 the shortage of shipping was so 
acute that Tokyo ordered a reversal of the.i~itial policy . Al~ emphasis was 
now to be placed on the economic self-suff1c1ency of every rcg1on .l l Food 
--~ -· ... -
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production was forcibly encouraged in every deficit area, and local authoritie~ 
were directed to use every effort to produce cloth and other needed manfac-
tures locally. During the last year of the war there was virtµally a total 
hreakdown of Japanese shipping movements. Somehow the Japanese war machine 
was kept in remarkable combat readiness, but the civilian economy was brought 
to its knees . 
As with all the colonial economies, the suspension of exports produced a 
massive dislocation. In the Indonesian case the plantat ion economy was never 
able to r ecover from the blow. Beneficial as they would have been to indepen· 
dent Indonesia's balance of payments, the Dutch sugar, rubber, tobacco and te1 
estates were not tied t o the interests of any important indigenous political 
force (as they were in the Philippines). Sugar-cultivation had never been 
popular among the Javanese peasants who were obliged to devote much of their 
land and labor to it, while smallholders in Sumatra were only too anxious to 
t urn the r ich plantation land over to subsistence crops. This shift of 
resources away from agricultural estates proved the most enduring economic 
result of the war, precisely because it was political l y popular -- however 
damaging t o the national budget. 
The other contribution of the military administration to the Indonesian econ-
omy was still more negat i ve, and still further at odds with Japanese official 
intentions. The wartime economy became increasingly a controlled economy as 
the war pr ogressed. The movement of goods between residencies (shu), and even 
between the smaller districts now called kabupaten (bunshu), was made illegal 
without a government license. Larger and larger percentages of the rice crop 
were requisitioned by the government at derisory prices , with scarce supplies 
of cloth, salt, and fertilizer distributed through the government hierarchy as 
an inducement to produce. All of this gave enormous economic power to 
officials, both Japanese and Indonesian, who had little experience in exer-
cising it. A flourishing black market in consumer goods soon appeared, and 
for tunes could be made i n "smuggling" goods from one district to another. 
Dur ing 1943-44 the newspapers published numerous reports of the arrest of 
"smugglers" or of corrupt officials who had abetted them, though in the final 
year of r2e war the situation appeared to be too far out of hand for such 
methods. Some Indonesian informants suggest that it was Japanese lower 
officials and civi lians who first instructed Indonesians in the art of 
discreet "inducements" for official favors, the filling out of invoices for 
lesser amounts than those received, and so forth. Certainly there was unpre-
cedented opportunity for enterprising dealers who were skil lful in the ways of 
bending or breaking oppressive official regulations. Such skills have not 
lost their utility since. 
If there were -;; f~w successe.s in growing new crops, the controlled economy had 
a di sastrous effect on the distribution of rice. Despite all Japanese efforts 
to open new· lands and increase food production, the harvest dropped lower with 
each year, until even normally "surplus" areas were in a desperate situation. 
There seem to have been three main reasons for this. One was the shortage of 
manpower as a result of the heavy Japanese demands for forced labor on roads, 
airfields, and defenses. According to one estimate on l y 60-65\ of sawah (wet-
rice fields) in Sumatr a were planted in 1945 for this reason.13 Another 
reason was that farmers tended to hide their rice, t o harvest and sel l it to 
"smugg l er s" at night, or even to avoid cultivation altogether rather than to 
surrender it to the Japanese. In some areas where Indonesian officials 
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dec lined to implement the draconian demands for requisitioned rice, farmers 
Appear to have had enough to eat even though there was very little to be had 
1n the market.14 The third factor, which caused the greatest bitterness among 
Indonesians, was the determination of the Japanese to stockpile rice as a 
~ecurity against the time they might have to fight a defensive guerrilla war 
·~ainst Allied invasion of the Indonesian islands. The officer responsible 
tor the stockpiling arrangements in Java conceded later that it was a source 
of much unnecessary bitterness, and that the officials concerned "interpreted 
the order in an exaggerated manner, trying to accumulate excessive quantities 
of food, labor, and munitions. 1115 · 
The last year of the war was a time of unprecedented deprivation for llOSt 
Indonesians. Many, especially in Java, were simply unable to obtain food and 
were seen "waiting for death" along the road.16 Cloth was out of reach to 
any but a favored minority, and many were forced to dress in sacking and rags. 
' 'c-t in the midst of this hardship the Japanese were taking good care of the 
lndonc-sian political elite, whom they had very effectively drawn into iovern-
tent and propaganda functions. The pamong-praja administrative corps which 
had served the Dutch lived no less well under the Japanese, and had greater 
opportunities for making a profit from their office if they chose to do so. 
For the nationalist and Islamic leaders whom the Dutch had regarded as a nui-
s3nce, the change at Japanese hands was dramatic. They were· given generous 
a 11 o~·ances, privileged access to cloth and other rations, and provided with a 
c3ptive audience for their propaganda . Even though many of them increasingly 
saw the activities they were engaged in as a sandiwara (theater), they could 
not then withdraw from their exposed position as mediators between ..theJapane$~ 
and an embittered population. Already in 1943 people were reportedly sayi'ng 
'"Our leaders are now living the good life but we are as poor as ever. 1117 By' 
the end of the war, those who had claimed to be leaders of the masses felt 
th~m~elves caught, together with the older elite, under the heavy yoke of 
pr~vile~e. As Ki Hadjar Dewantoro put it, "The reputation of the leaders is 
ruined in the eyes of the people."18 Retribution came after the Japanese 
surrender, most of its victims being the pamong-praja through whom forced 
labor and rice deliveries had been imposed. There was no leadership to gal-
vanize a peasant revolution in 1945, but the raw material was there to an 
extent which may be unique in Indonesian history. 
Political Leadership 
Before_ the war.the Indonesian nationalist movement had succeeded remarkably in 
exten~ing th~ idea of an Indonesian national identity, through an active but low-circ~lation Indonesian press, to urban centers throughout the whole archi-
~elago. It suffered, however, from two major handicaps. The first was the 
i_n~ernal bickering among the small group of Dutch-educated political leaders, 
which caused frequent splits in old parties and the creation of new ones; the 
other was the absence of any substantial contact with the "masses" in whose 
~aite the politicians professed to act. Dutch surveillance of political activ-
ity_ was extraordinarily complete, and the authoriti es allowed politicians t~~ir freedom only so long as they seemed ineffective . A!ly radical party 
which bega~ to_ obtain large- sca le support in the countryside was quickly 
s ackled with impossible res t rictions, and i t s leaders imprisoned or exiled. 
The Japanese regime presented quite different opportunities: politicians lost 
even more of their freedom to say what they thought in print, to fo:rni parties 
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of their choosing, and to associate with their comrades in other islands. In 
terms of the prewar deficiencies of the nat i onalist movement, however, these 
losses were more than counterbalanced by the gains. )lni.t.)Lwas virtually_ 
(.Qrceg on politicians: if wanted to be publ' · ur.es-a.t:.--a.ll.,- th.ey had to 
join in the s ingle propag~da bD y w ic as allowed in each a~ea...__j f they -
did so, ~ the_g_i:eat-ma.}OI,l.t.y did, they hacLthe-unaccust.omecLexpe.ci.enGe of... 
addressing a mass audience, often with people trucked in from surrounding 
villages a government expense t o add to the grandeur of a public occasi~. 
The~nese calendar was dotted with such festivities -- the emperor'S birth-
day, the anniversary of Pearl Harbor , the anniversary of the Japanese arrival 
in each area, the "acceptance" of each Japanese concession toward independence, 
with appropriate speeches of gratitude, and the tours around his region by 
ever y leader who made a visi t to Japan. The approved leadership of each area 
was built up through such means and in the controlled media. 
Such exposure may not have brought the Indonesian masses to love their leaders; 
the earlier discussion suggests that would not be the right word. Still less 
did it make possible the building up of a loyal , efficient, and educated cadre 
structure -- the lack of which has been a feature of Indonesian politics ever 
since. But it did at least make known t o the masses who their leaders were.-
At each administrative level the Japanese encouraged, or even forced, the emer-
gence of a clearly acknowledged leadership among the more charismatic politi-
cal or religious figures available. Previously antagonistic political party 
leaders were obliged to join unitary propaganda bodies; various shades of 
reformed or unreformed Islamic opinion were obliged to accept a part in an 
overarching Islamic body; Protestants and Catholics were represented in a 
unitary Christian body, which in turn in many areas was linked to an organiza-
tion for religious leadership in general. Although there were times when the 
leaders of these organizations felt themselves to be merely captive playthings 
of the J apanese, the period which followed the promise of independence in 
September 1944 saw them gradual l y emerging to positions where they could take 
over government without serious challenge from their colleagues. 
It is difficult to categorize any of these pemimpin, whether at the "national" 
(meaning J ava) or l ocal levels, as Quislings or puppets, in the sense of owing 
their position to their pro-Japanese attitudes rather than their capacity to 
arouse popular supp~rt . The overtly pro-Japanese figures were generally dis-
carded wi t hin the first year, and the increasingly acute Japanese need to 
exhort t he population to greater sacrifice led them to prefer figures who were 
really effective in this role. Sukarno was of course the outstanding benefi-
ciary of this process. As he frequently said in defense of his cooperation 
with the Japanese, "I addressed 50,000 at one meeting, 100, 000 at another. 
Suk~rno•s face, not just his name, penetrated the Archipel ago. I have the 
Japanese to thank for that."19 While l ess prepared than many nationalists to 
criticize the Japanese, Sukarno was adept at using his oppor tunities to arouse 
his mass audiencP. to nationalist fervor. Many did hold him guilty for his 
share in Japanese oppression,20 and he might well have been expected to fall 
rapidly from gra~e after the Japanese surrender. Yet even the symbol of non-
cooperation with the Japanese , Sjahrir, had to concede in October 1945 that 
Sukarno was indispensable as President. When, three years later, Sukarno's 
position was put to a public test by the communist denunciation of his as 
"Quis ling, slave of Japan, romusha dealer and heiho propagandist," he appeared 
to emerge stronger than ever:-zr-Tite point here may be that Sukarno's position 
rested not on specific actions he had taken or views he r epresented, but in 
having become preeminently pemimpin kita (our leader) in a situation of con-
frontation with outsiders. 
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Under the Japanese, Indonesia was divided into three parts with very little 
Indonesian co~tact permitted between them. The Japanese 16th Army guided Java 
along a relatively progressive path towards political emancipation; the 25th 
Army d~fended Sumatra against an~ leadership emanating from Java; while in the 
other islands the Japanese Navy implemented a policy designed to retain peI'll&-
ncnt Japanese control. The leadership of Sukarno and Hatta strictly extended 
only to Java , therefore, although after April 1945 the Navy ' did allow these 
le~de7s also to .visit Makasar, Bali, ~n~ Banjermasin. Sin~e the overwhelmins 
ma1ority of national-level prewar politicians were based in Java, however, 
their acceptance of Sukarno's and Hatta's preeminence was more than half the 
battle. I~ Sumatra and the Navy area, comparable pemimpin had emerged at the 
local, residency l~v~l -- Mohammad Sjafei in West Sumatra, Teuku Njak Arif in 
Aceh, Dr. A.K. Gani tn Palembang, Dr. Ratulangie in Makasar, Pangeran Mohammad 
Noor in Banjermasin, and so forth. After the proclamation of Indonesian inde-
pendence these people were declared to be Residents or Governors of their 
respective areas, and had as little difficulty as Sukarno and Hatta nationally 
in having their leadership accepted by their elite peers. The contrast with 
the prewar factionalism is remarkable. In general, these leaders appear to 
have been accepted by the whole political e·lite because it was recognized that 
political leadership under the Japanese was a very dangerous and exposed g1111e, 
and that those who had become proficient at it should continue to exen:ise 
r~sponsibility, at least as long as the Japanese provided the principal poten-
~ial ~hreat to the Republic. By the time the Dutch had replac.ed the ._Japanese 
in this role, at the end of 1945, leadership had acquired its own mom.entua. 
The Dutch had ruled the Indies as a centralized state, while resorting to 
sophisticated devices to prevent the unification of their opponents. The 
Japane~e, by contrast, did divide Indonesia very effectively, yet the result 
was still further to strengthen the forces of political unity. Just because 
Java alone was . allowed to develop an island-wide leadership, it was impossible 
for any other island to move in a radically different direction in 1945. In 
July and August of 1945, when the 25th Army saw that it could not resist Tokyo 
pressure ~or independence any longer, it made belated plans for a separate 
Sumatran independence, but so bungled its preparation that the effect was 
co~terproductive.22 Moreover, as I have remarked elsewhere, "Almost every 
social and ethnic group in Sumatra was irked by the extreme isolation of the 
Japa~ese period. Only those with long memories were particularly conscious of 
et~nic and regional suspicions at the war's end. The enthusiasm of youth for 
-· unity above all was heightened by the fact that they had never had the oppor-
tunity to enjoy it."23 
Indonesian Identity 
If colonial sys~ems can be divided into crusading and exclusivist types, the 
Japanese emphatically represented the former -- 11ke the sixteenth-century 
Portuguese or the early Americans i n the Philippines . Their most idealistic 
vanguard of ~his . crusade, the young teachers sent to the south to open new 
schools and institutes, tended to believe that the Indonesians were essen-
tially like the Japanese, but "spoiled and lacking in moral training as a 
result of insidious Dutch guidance."24 As one headmaster told his carefully 
selected students, "You were not brought here to enjoy yourselves but to learn 
Japanese seishin (spirit), to learn di scipline and hard work... know how 
lazy the westerners are, and the laziness they have taught you for hundreds of 
years is going to be wiped out."25 This onslaught on the colonial value 
system had some important results, as will be seen below. Far more important 
than any 'Japanization' of the Indonesian population, however, was the consol-
idation of a particular definition of Indonesian identity. 
Language was an important part of this. Dutch was abolished and Indonesian 
made official in 1942, in a fashion more abrupt and complete than any indepen-
dent Indonesian government could have brought about. Language commissions 
were established in Jakarta and in Medan to standardize the language, but more 
important wa~ the practical experience of simply having to use it in areas 
where Dutch had JlUViously held Slo'al'-- Moreover, the freeing of I~ 
- literature from its sense of cultural inferiority towards Dutch appeared to 
have a profoundly stimulating effect. A. Teeuw has made a strong case for 
regarding 1942 rather than 1945 as the real watershed, the birthdate of modern 
Indonesian literature.26 
New Indonesian language textbooks were urgently required, and new historical 
myths to replace the overthrown mythology of Dutch imperialism. Here the 
Japanese made little contribution from their own national mythology, and 
seemed content to encourage Indonesian nationalists in the anti-colonial 
emphasis which was natural to them. In the twenties and thirties nationalist 
intellectuals had daringly attacked Dutch "heroes" and exalted anti-Dutch 
Indonesian "villians" in ephemeral undergraduate newspapers, but they now 
found their counter myths proclaimed with all the force of the mass media and 
mass displays. 
In a lavish style they [the Japanese] encouraged the holding of 
mass rallies and simultaneous meetings. The statue of Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen which had been the symbol of Jakarta city and 
the symbol of colonial power was taken down with every fol'll of 
ceremony which could mobilize national •sentiment.•27 
In many areas the Japanese consciously encouraged the rewriting of history in 
an anti-colonial sense, by establishing historical commissions and launching 
contests for historically-oriented works.28 A film was made on the history of 
Sumatra by the Nippon .Eiga Sha corporation, leading from the grandeur of the 
precolonial past and s'cenes from the Aceh war, to the climax of the Japanese 
landings in 1942. 29 The repertoire of the Aceh Seinendan's theater group may 
be indicative of the type of mythology encouraged under the Japanese. One 
play, perhaps a necessary concession to the Japanese, crudely adapted the 
famous story of Momotaro. Momotaro, who represents Japan, is on his way to 
fight the devil of Western imperialism when he meets three suffering figures --
Indonesia, the Philippines and China. They join him and defeat the enemy. 
Another pl~y told the story of two Indonesian friends, one of whom was arrested 
by the Dutch for his nationalistic w:-itings . Despite the torture he undergoes 
in prison, he tells his captors that they will never be able to build anything 
t o riva l the grandeur of Borobodur. The Dutch have reduced Indonesian liter-
acy from the 40 percent of Hindu times, he proudly claims, to the present 4 
percent. Meanwhile, his former friend has betrayed the cause by joining the 
Dutch police. Both die soon after the Japanese landings of 1942, one as a 
traitor, the other as a hero. Two other works in the repertoire were set in 
the 1942 Acehnese revolt against the Dutch, and another during the 1926 
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"flalongan revolt" in southwestern Aceh.30 
The effect of all this raising of anti-colonial consciousness may have been to 
con~olid3te a new nationalist orthodoxy which has proved remarkably durable . 
The textbooks of national history written hurriedly by nationalists during the 
Japanese period have been reprinted many times since and adopted by the Repub-
11 can school system . While Sanusi Pane's Sejarah Indones ia (1943)31 is the 
...,~ t ~uccess ful in this sense , it was replicated in numerous local . and region-
al h l ~torles.32 Moreover , it was in the last year of the occupation that 
M<ih~mmad Yamin, later to be the cultural commissar of Sukarno's "Guided 
l\emocracy," developed his historical ideas as head of the.. propaganda depart-
aent for Java.33 
Tlie central elements of the new orthodoxy of Pane, Yamin and their colleagues 
vc re n clorious precolonial past, followed by three and a half dark centuri~s 
of (lutch rule illuminated only by the sacrificial struggle of those from each 
rr~ion who fought the Dutch most stubbornly. Even in the large areas of the 
outer i s lands which had known less than fifty years of Dutch rule this myth 
~ e emcd irresistible, encouraged no doubt by the propaganda value of contrast-
In~ three and a half years of Japanese rule with three and a half centuries of 
llut ch. The pantheon of approved Indonesian heroes also grew better defined as 
~treets were named and ceremonies held in.their honor.34 While the shape of 
thi s national past owed very little to the Japanese, its projection into an 
official orthodoxy for the new nation was greatly speeded by wartime propaganda 
needs. 
The same appears true of the implanting of the national flag and anthem as 
S)'l:lbol s of national identity for the whole population, not simply therurban 
nationalists who had taken them up before the war . Following Koiso's promise 
of "independence in the future," in September 1944, the flag and anthea 
became obligatory on every public occasion. As Dr . Amir later ob~ed, the 
Japanese-inspired propag.anda...!!.di.d.Jnore in one ~6f"""the idea of pOTrtical 
unity and urge for independence t h_im_ten _years of ordinary _J>ropaganda erote -
the w .,35 In terms of these external symbols of national i denti t Y:-the 
change between 1942 and 1945 was astonishing to outside observers . Indonesia 
"'as no longer an intellectual idea but a vital factor in popular consciousness. 
TI!e development of an Indonesian style of political behavior is far more 
difficult to trace. What can be stated is that the wartime environment created 
favorable conditions for one particular current of Indonesian political thought 
to find its way into the definition of this "Indonesian way. " 
Examining the twenty years which followed the Japanese occupation, Herbert . 
Fe i th delineated three broad characteris tics of Indones ian political thought --
a "~iffusely moral" quality, optimism , and what he call ed "a tendency to see 
soc1e~y as undifferentiated." Even for the Is lamic and Marxi st parties "there 
"'as little concepti on of segmental groups having legi timate i nterests . Nor 
"'as much concern expressed for the individual . "36 
Such a tendency could have been described at least among Javanese i ntellec-
tuals as soon as they came into collision with European democratic idea ls . In 
the 1920s the l eading spokesman for a Javanese pol i tical model based on the 
natural leadership of a father within his family was Soet atmo Soer iokoesoemo, 
a member of the Paku Alam royal house and a gr ea t influence on the early 
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development of the Taman Siswa educational movement . "Wise men should be at 
t he head of the state ," he insisted, "and should be chosen by the Wise, not by 
the peopl e . ,.37 lf such a current was always present, its p~li tical ~~ression 
was not qu i te intellectually respectable among the modem-minded political 
act ivis ts of the nationalist movement in the 1930s . 
~nil e the Japanese appear to have contributed no political ideas of their own 
to the Indones ian political debate, they did create a climate i~ w~i~ it.was 
good form to begin a speech with a ritual rejection of western individualisa 
and liberalism, which "invariably gave rise to imperialism and exploi~ation. 038 
I t would be impossible to evaluate the long-term effect of such a climate were 
i t not that the documents which have become the central symbols of "the Indo-
nes ian way" in politics were drawn up at its height -- notably the 1945 
Cons titution and the Pancasila idea. These were written and debated in the 
bodies appointed by the Japanese in the middle of 1945 . to prepare for a 
J apanese-supervised "independence." While the Indonesian delegates were 
r emarkabl y successful in excluding any direct Japanese influence, "western" 
ideas about individual rights and political pluralism undoubtedly played a 
s maller role in the discussions than they would have in prewar or postwar con-
di tions . Professor Supomo, the leading judicial official in Java under th~ 
Japanese and a great be liever in a distinct Javanese mod~l, took . the l.ead in . 
drafting the 1945 Constitution. As he explained the basis of this Constitution: 
The inner spirit and spiritual structure of the Indonesian.people 
i s characterized by the ideal of the unity of life, the unity 
kawulo-gusti, that is of the outer and the inner world! of the 
macrocosmos and the microcosmos, of the people and their leaders. 
All men as individuals, every group or grouping of men in a 
soci etl .• . is considered to have its own place and its own obliga-
t ions Ldharma] according to the law of nature, the whole being 
aimed at achieving spiritual and physical balance . • •• So it is clear 
t hat if we want to establish an Indonesian state in accordance with 
the characteristic features of Indonesian society, it must be based 
on an integralist state philosophy, on the idea of a sta~e which is 
united with all its people, which transcends all groups in every 
field.39 
In keeping with these ideas, the 1945 Constitution gave_ very strong_p~wer~ to 
the President to whom the cabinet was responsible, defined no specific rights 
for the individual except education and the freedom of religion, and stated. 
that "the economy shall be organized as a common endeavor based upon the prin-
ciple of the family system." In both the Constitution and Sukarno's Pancasila 
speech the word kerakyatan (peopleness ) t~nd~ to be preferred to demokrasi, 
and is de f ined in terms of a consensus principle -- musyawarah and mufakat. 
The re l evant clause of the preamble to the Constitution is officially transla-
t ed "democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising 
out of de liberation among representatives. 1140 
In the reaction which followed the Japanese surrender these documents were put 
aside f or a time as both impractical and undemocratic, but since 1959 they 
have again become the central elements of "the Indonesian way." 
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~1lltary Mobiliiation 
Tll• ..ost striking c?ntribution of t~e Japanese period, however, will probably 
M> seen as the way it armed Indonesians for the revolution which followed. 
l <'r those who had known.the Javanese in particular as "the mildest people on 
Hrth," the transformation wrought by the war was astonishing. The mobilh.a-
t Ion of the population for military purposes was the only major change which 
,olncided with the deliberate intentions of the Japanese rulers although it 
astwoed a scale and direction which they could hardly have anti~~pated. 
I have suggested the briefcase as a metaphor for the prewar period because of 
the e111phasis on technical and scientific superiority as the key'to colonial 
rower. Expertise was increasingly the justit'ication for Dutchmen to remain in 
rosi tions of authority. A good western education was the chief means the 
colonial system afforded to rise to a position of parity with the Dutch masters. 
Tllc brighest stars of the Dutch East Indies were men like the Djajadiningrat 
brothers, Mohammad Hatta, and Dr. Soetomo, who had absorbed the best that a 
C>utch education had to offer and thereby mastered what seemed to be the inner 
·~· steries of Dutch control. It was of course precisely such people who could 
lead the ~ationalist movement, who could highlight Dutch failures to Jive up 
to Dutch ideas of democracy, efficiency. <!lld. jus tice, and who could advance the 
credentials of Indonesians like themselves to do the job more thoroughly. 
As indicated above, the Japanese military took the view that Dutch educ.ation 
had been disastrously elitist, academic and impractical. They put the heavi-
est emp~asis in their own educational efforts on physical fitness, toughness, 
discipline, ~atriotism, and a spirit of sacrificial service to the group./ 
~~ny Indonesians who went through Japanese schools and institutions testify to 
the startling change from the Dutch pattern, the closeness of the yo\Ulg 
J3panese teachers to their pupils, and the physical and mental toughness they 
~a1ned ~rom the process . By the end of the war a very large proportion of 
l~do~es~an y~wig me~ had had some exposure to Japanese methods of drilling and d1s~1plin~, if not in the schools then in one of the many youth and propaganda 
bodies which trained with wooden rifles or bamboo spears. As Adam Malik put it: 
.. . through the controlled wartime economy and other measures such 
as f~rced labour and systematic drilliJlg of all social strata, ••• 
the im~a~t of the four-year occupation upon our national mentality 
and spirit was very great. We could say that during those four 
Y~ars our whole nation underwent a fundamental spiritual revolu-
tion .. In the course of four years of Japanese oppression the 
- ·eco~omic and social condition of Indonesia was progressively turned 
upside-down, dissolved, and destroyed ••• 41 
~~l~e ~as entirely immune from this process. Even sultans, rajas and politi-
h ea ers were obliged to show a different sort of lead to their people than t at to which th h d b d. 1 ey a een accustomed. Japanese-controlled media frequently ~sld~yed the startling sight of such worthies with their sleeves rolled up 
wie. ing a hoe before the cameras to open some new project. One Japanese 
agricultural tra · · · · h d · 
0 Th ining institute ex or te its graduates to work without a shirt i~· b e Japanese certainly failed to break the colonial white-collar mental-
y, ut they cannot be accused of not trying. 
If Leiden graduates were the wayward favori t e sons of the prewar regime, the 
I 
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Japanese mili t ary also spawned a favored progeny in its own image. The new 
elite were the Indonesian officer corps of the Peta and ~. bright young 
men who had undergone the same tough training as Japanese officers. They had 
drwik most deeply of Japanese seishin, the heroic spirit of the true patriot; 
they had learned the style of sharp command, of violent action, so much at 
variance with the habits of both the traditional Javanese ~and the 
Leiden graduate; they had absorbed an impatience with bureaucratic methods and 
aristocratic ni ceties; they had earned not only the cropped hair and the 
J apanese-style unifonn but eventually also the right t o wear the new badge of 
status i n wartime Indonesia - - t he sword of the samurai. They too found that 
Japanese practice did not match Japanese ideals, and r eacted sharply when the 
Japanese failed to give them the equal t r eatment to which thei r rank entitled 
them. Experiencing the same mixture of outrage and admiration the Dutch had 
for their wayward sons, the Japanese military were now i n turn faced with 
rebellion, by the Peta in Blitar and the~ in East Sumatra and Aceh. ij 
The fi r st real test of the seishin of these officers came after the surrender, 
when they demanded from their former patrons that Japanese arms be handed over 
to them. 
h~en Indonesian independence was declared, most of this new elite were young 
men in their earl y twenties, in no position to challenge the older Dutch-
educated nationalists for l eadership. Four years later, however, they had 
tested their own claims t o leadership in the violence of the revolution, while 
the old civilian leadership had frequently been found wanting in their eyes . 
Al though they did not assume national leadership until 1966, they could never 
be ignored as an alternative source of authority in independent Indonesia. 
Conclusion 
This essay has attempted to show that t he Japanese occupation had a major 
impact on the subsequent shape of Indonesia -- whether for better or worse is 
not for me to judge. It armed Indonesians to resist successfully the rei1RpO-
sition of the prewar regime, it witnessed the consolidation of Indonesian 
unity and identity, and it encouraged the emergence on the one hand of a new 
military e lite, and on the other of a political leadership which was stronger 
on charisma and r hetoric than on political organization and cadre fonnation . 
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